

## Message Text

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SSO-00 NRC-07 NEA-10 /079 W  
-----048845 172005Z /43

O 171925Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5203  
USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE  
USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE

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SECDEF WASHDC FOR OSD/PA; COPENHAGEN FOR SECDEF PARTY;  
USICA WASHDC FOR PGM/P, IEU

E.O. 11652: N/A

SUBJECT: LONDON PRESS CONFERENCE BY U.S. DEFENSE  
SECRETARY, HAROLD BROWN APRIL 17TH, 1978.

BROWN: I HAVE BEEN IN THE U.K. FOR THE PAST FEW DAYS  
AND TOOK THIS OCCASION TO VISIT SOME U.S. FORCES AND  
ALSO SPENT A DAY WITH THE U.K. DEFENCE MINISTER  
VISITING SOME BRITISH ROYAL AIR FORCE AND ROYAL NAVY  
UNITS. I WAS MUCH IMPRESSED BY WHAT I SAW BOTH AT  
THE U.S. AND AT THE BRITISH UNITS. SUBSEQUENTLY THIS  
MORNING SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE MULLEY AND I  
MET TO TALK ABOUT BILATERAL MATTERS OF VARIOUS KINDS  
AND THEN I HAD THE GOOD FORTUNE TO MEET WITH PRIME  
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MINISTER CALLAGHAN FOR HALF AN HOUR THIS AFTERNOON,  
AGAIN TO DISCUSS BILATERAL MATTERS. I WOULD BE PLEASED  
TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, SOME NATO ALLIES  
AND SOME POLITICIANS IN THIS COUNTRY ARE VERY  
DISAPPOINTED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAS DECIDED NOT TO

GO AHEAD WITH THE NEUTRON BOMB, INDEED THEY SAY THEY FEEL LET DOWN. DO THEY HAVE ANY REASON, DO YOU FEEL, TO FEEL LET DOWN?

BROWN: NO I DON'T THINK SO. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WAS TO DEFER A DECISION ON PRODUCTION OF THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON. HE HAS DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH MODERNISATION OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING WEAPONS FOR THE LANCE AND THE EIGHT-INCH SHELL, THAT WILL LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDING TO THEM AT A LATER DATE ENHANCED RADIATION CHARACTERISTICS. IT WILL ALSO PUT ON THE SOVIET UNION THE NEED TO FACE UP TO THE ISSUE OF WHAT, IF ANYTHING, IT PLANS TO DO IN THE WAY OF RESTRAINING ITS MILITARY PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENTS. THE PRESIDENT THEN WILL AT A LATER TIME BE IN A POSITION TO DECIDE EITHER TO PRODUCE OR NOT TO PRODUCE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS. I THINK THE ALLIANCE IS NOW IN A POSITION OF VERY GREAT FLEXIBILITY IN THIS REGARD AND THE PRESIDENT HAS POSITIONED HIMSELF SO AS TO MAKE A DECISION ON THE BASIS OF WHAT HAPPENS FROM NOW ON.

QUESTION: THERE HAS ALSO BEEN SOME CRITICISM IN THIS COUNTRY ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BRITAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE NATO ALLIANCE. WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ON THAT?

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BROWN: LIKE THE REST OF THE NATO ALLIES, BRITAIN COULD DO MORE. IT HAS BEEN LATELY DECIDING TO DO MORE. OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF YEARS IT WILL BE INCREASING ITS CONTRIBUTION BY 3 PER CENT A YEAR. I LOOK FORWARD TO THAT HAPPENING AND AM PLEASED TO SEE THAT BRITAIN HAS DECIDED THAT.

QUESTION: DO YOU THINK IT IS ENOUGH?

BROWN: AS I SAY, I THINK ALL OF US COULD DO MORE. I THINK THAT THERE IS ANOTHER WAY TO GET MORE EFFECTIVENESS OUT OF THE ALLIANCE AND THAT IS FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES TO CONCERT THEIR EFFORTS BETTER. WHEN YOU TAKE OUR TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS - U.S., CANADA, EUROPEAN COUNTRIES - IN THE WAY OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, THEY EXCEED THOSE OF THE SOVIET UNION, BUT BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN WORKING TOO MUCH EACH IN HIS OWN DIRECTION WE DON'T GET THE MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY OUT OF THAT. OUR EFFORTS ON THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PLANNING PROCESS ARE DESIGNED TO CHANGE THAT SITUATION SO THAT WE ARE ABLE TO MAKE OUR EQUIPMENT, IF NOT STANDARDISED, INTEROPERABLE AND SO THAT WE CAN PLAN OUR MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SUCH A

WAY AS TO MAXIMISE EFFICIENCY, PUTTING FORCES IN  
THE RIGHT PLACE, SPENDING OUR LIMITED DEFENSE FUNDS

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SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5204  
USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
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ON THINGS THAT ARE MOST NEEDED FOR THE ALLIANCE. FROM  
A SHORT TERM STANDPOINT, WE HAVE ALREADY DURING THE  
PAST YEAR SINCE THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING IN LONDON LAST  
YEAR CONCENTRATED ON A FEW SHORT TERM PROGRAMS WHICH  
INCLUDE ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, WAR RESERVE MATERIAL AND  
READINESS AND RE-ENFORCEMENT, AND BY DOING THAT WE HAVE  
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED OUR MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN THE  
ALLIANCE. TO SUMMARISE WHAT I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO  
SAY ABOUT THIS ISSUE, WE CAN GET MORE THAN  
THE 3 PER CENT TO WHICH THE ALLIANCE MEMBERS HAVE  
AGREED BY BEING MORE EFFICIENT IN OUR EXPENDITURES,  
AND I THINK WE CAN AND WILL DO THAT.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, WOULD THE UNITED STATES  
OBJECT TO THE SALE OF HARRIER VERTICAL TAKEOFF AIRCRAFT  
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TO CHINA, AND IF SO, FOR WHAT REASON?

BROWN: I THINK THAT THAT IS AN ISSUE THAT HAS NOT REALLY COME TO A DECISION POINT YET.. I THINK THAT THE U.K. WILL WANT TO CONSIDER ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PRC (PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA) VERY CAREFULLY, INCLUDING RELATIONS INVOLVING THE SALE OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. I AM NOT PREPARED TO EXPRESS A VIEW ON THIS MATTER.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, STILL ON THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH PRC, ON WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE NUCLEAR POWERED SENSOR LOST IN THE HIMALAYAS AND ANYTHING TO DO WITH DEPLOYMENT, AND ALSO CAN YOU TELL US HOW YOU RECONCILE THE LOSS OF SUCH A NUCLEAR POWERED DEVICE WITH THE FUSS THAT WAS CREATED WHEN A RUSSIAN SATELLITE ....

BROWN: I HAVE VERY LITTLE TO TELL YOU ABOUT IT. THE SOVIET SATELLITE, I WOULD NOTE, WAS A REACTOR WHICH DISPERSED ITS FISSION PRODUCTS OVER A VERY WIDE AREA OF CANADA. WHATEVER THE U.S. HAD INVOLVED WAS NOT A NUCLEAR REACTOR. IT COULD NOT HAVE PRESENTED THE SAME KIND OF PROBLEMS, BUT BEYOND THAT I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO DETAIL.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, WOULD YOU COMMENT ON CHINESE REPORTS THAT SOVIET AIRCRAFT ARE FLYING RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS INTO AMERICAN AIRSPACE FROM BASES IN CUBA?

BROWN: SOVIET AIRCRAFT DO PENETRATE WHAT IS CALLED THE AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPT ZONE FROM TIME TO TIME. THAT IS NOT AMERICAN AIRSPACE. IT IS BEYOND THE CLAIMED  
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TERRITORIAL SEA AND AIR LIMITS AND SO IT DOES NOT POSE THE KIND OF PROBLEM IMPLIED IN WHAT YOU ASKED. WE, OF COURSE, OFTEN RESPOND TO FLIGHTS NEAR TO THE UNITED STATES BY SENDING UP INTERCEPTORS TO MEET THEM BUT THAT IS NOT A HOSTILE ACT - NEITHER IS A HOSTILE ACT - AND IT IS ALL ACCORDING TO THE EXISTING RULES GOVERNING KEEPING OUT OF OTHER COUNTRIES' AIRSPACE.

QUESTION: WHAT DOES MODERNISATION OF YOUR TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MEAN, IF IT DOES NOT MEAN INSTALLING

THE NEW WARHEAD?

BROWN: IT MEANS INSTALLING A NEW WARHEAD IN THEM,  
BUT ONE THAT DOES NOT CONTAIN AN ENHANCED RADIATION  
FEATURE. I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO CLASSIFIED  
DETAILS ABOUT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -  
WEIGHTS, YIELD AND SO FORTH - BUT I WILL SAY  
THAT THESE ALLOW, DEPENDING UPON THE SITUATION, THE  
UNLOADING OF CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS WHICH THESE SAME  
LANCE MISSILES CARRY AND EIGHT-INCH ARTILLERY FIRES  
AND THEIR UPLOADING WITH NUCLEAR SHELLS OR WARHEADS  
RESPECTIVELY IN A SHORT TIME BY FEWER PEOPLE AND THE  
PROVIDING OF GREATER RANGE TO THE CARRIER, TO THE  
SHELL OR TO THE MISSILE.

QUESTION: IN OTHER WORDS, A LIGHTER WARHEAD?

BROWN: THAT COULD BE ONE CHANGE, YES.

QUESTION: IT MUST BE RATHER BORING FOR YOU TO KEEP  
HAVING TO WORK OVER THIS REACTION TO THE NEUTRON  
BOMB HERE ....

BROWN: I FIND IT VERY INTERESTING.

QUESTION: .... IS IT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE  
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SSO-00 NRC-07 NEA-10 /079 W  
-----048905 172006Z /43

O 171925Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5205  
USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
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RUSSIANS EITHER TO CUT DOWN ON THEIR TANK FORCES IN  
EASTERN EUROPE OR TO PUT OFF DEPLOYING THE SS 20S,  
BECAUSE IN FACT THE RUSSIANS WERE REACTING OVER  
THE WEEKEND SAYING THERE WOULD BE NO QUID PRO QUO  
ON THE NEUTRON BOMB?

BROWN: IS IT REALISTIC? ONLY IF ONE CAN BELIEVE  
SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT THE NEED FOR RESTRAINT IN  
DEPLOYMENTS. IN OTHER WORDS, IF THEY BELIEVE WHAT  
THEY SAY THEN IT'S REALISTIC.

QUESTION: YOU MENTIONED JUST NOW "A LATER DATE" WHEN  
THE DECISION ON THE NEUTRON (WEAPON) WOULD BE TAKEN.  
CAN YOU BE A LITTLE MORE SPECIFIC. JUST HOW MUCH  
TIME IS ANYONE NOW PREPARED TO ALLOW ....  
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BROWN: NO, I CANNOT BE MORE SPECIFIC BECAUSE THERE IS  
NO SINGLE DATE AT WHICH SUCH A DECISION NEED BE  
TAKEN.

QUESTION: AT THIS TIME DO YOU THINK THERE IS  
SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE  
NEUTRON BOMB WITHIN THE WEST EUROPEAN MEMBER OF  
NATO TO JUSTIFY THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION GOING  
AHEAD OR WOULD MORE SUPPORT BE REQUIRED?

BROWN: I DON'T WANT TO REHEARSE IN FUTURE TENSE  
WHAT HAS HAPPENED OVER THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS IN  
PAST TENSE. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO DEFER A  
DECISION MAKES IT UNNECESSARY TO SPECULATE ABOUT  
THAT. I THINK THAT IT IS CLEAR THAT AS A CONSEQUENCE  
OF EVENTS OF THE LAST MONTH THERE IS MORE PUBLIC  
SUPPORT IN THE U.S. AND MORE ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR  
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A DEPLOYMENT THAN MAY HAVE

BEEN PRESENT EARLIER, BUT BY AND LARGE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE ALLIES PERHAPS WITHOUT EXCEPTION, I CANNOT THINK OF ANY EXCEPTION, THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AS HE HAS MADE IT TO DEFER A DECISION AND I THINK THAT IS A VERY GOOD POSITION TO BE IN.

QUESTION: DR. BROWN, IF THE NEUTRON WEAPON SHOULD BE PRODUCED WOULD IT EVER BE DEPLOYED IN BRITAIN, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT'S RESOLUTION THAT WOULD PERMIT IT BEING STATIONED IN GERMANY ONLY IF IT WERE STATIONED IN ONE OTHER EUROPEAN NATION.

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BROWN: WELL, IT COULD BE STORED IN GREAT BRITAIN. FOR IT TO BE DEPLOYED IN GREAT BRITAIN OPERATIONALLY AND EFFECTIVELY WOULD REQUIRE WARSAW PACT FORCES TO HAVE REACHED THE CHANNEL, SINCE THE SYSTEMS IN WHICH IT WOULD BE DEPLOYED HAVE RATHER LIMITED RANGES, RANGES OF THE ORDER OF TENS CERTAINLY NO MORE THAN A HUNDRED KILOMETRES.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, IF THERE IS NO RESTRICTION BY THE RUSSIANS ON DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS20, WHAT DO YOU ANTICIPATE COULD BE THE REACTION OF NATO?

BROWN: I WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THE REACTION OF NATO WOULD BE ONE OF VERY GREAT CONCERN IN GENERAL TERMS, BECAUSE THE SS20 PROVIDES A VERY SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO NATO MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POPULATION CENTERS, COMPRISING AS IT DOES SEVERAL WARHEADS IN EACH SS20 OF YIELDS OF THE ORDER OF A MEGATON PERHAPS. YOU MULTIPLY THAT BY THE NUMBER OF SS20S AND YOU GET A VERY, VERY SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY THREAT. IT IS NOT A MILITARY THREAT DIFFERENT IN KIND FROM WHAT HAS EXISTED FOR MANY YEARS, BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD MEDIUM RANGE AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES CAPABLE OF REACHING ALL PARTS OF EUROPE SINCE THE 1960S BOTH, AS I SAY, IN MISSILE FORM AND ALSO MEDIUM RANGE BOMBERS, BUT SS20 DEPLOYMENT REEMPHASISES THIS. IT PRODUCES A NEW AND HIGHLY CAPABLE SYSTEM, ONE THAT IS QUITE DIFFICULT TO TARGET IN TURN BECAUSE IT IS A MOBILE SYSTEM. I WOULD,- THEREFORE, EXPECT THAT THE NATO NATIONS WOULD REACT BY CONSIDERING THIS A SOVIET MOVE TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF MEDIUM RANGE FORCES IN EUROPE AND, THUS, A THREATENING MOVE.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THE RUSSIANS HAVE IN EFFECT  
SAID THERE WILL BE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN ANY CONCESSIONS  
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SSO-00 NRC-07 NEA-10 /079 W  
-----049004 172007Z /43

O 171925Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON  
TO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5206  
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ON THEIR PART AND THE NEUTRON BOMB. THEREFORE, IF  
WE TAKE THAT AS OUR PREMISE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL  
MAKE NO SUCH CONCESSIONS, CAN WE ALSO ASSUME THAT  
THERE WILL BE PRODUCTION OF THE NEUTRON BOMB?

BROWN: THE PRESIDENT HAS SAID THAT SOVIET ACTIONS  
IN RESPECT OF WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND MILITARY  
FORCE DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN A  
DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO PRODUCE AND TO DEPLOY  
ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPONS. AND IT MEANS JUST THAT -



AN IMPORTANT FACTOR. SOVIET ACTIONS WERE WHAT HE SPOKE OF NOT SOVIET STATEMENTS. THOSE ARE OFTEN CONNECTED BUT NOT ALWAYS IDENTICAL. AND AS HIS STATEMENT IMPLIES THAT IS NOT THE ONLY ISSUE. WE WILL BE LOOKING AT THE DEFENSE POSTURE IN GENERAL, UNCLASSIFIED

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WE WILL BE LOOKING AT VARIOUS WAYS TO MEET WARSAW PACT MILITARY CAPABILITIES. THE ENHANCED RADIATION WEAPON IS ONE OF THEM, AND A COST EFFECTIVE ONE. BUT AS I HAVE SAID FROM THE BEGINNING, THOUGH IT IS A VALUABLE, USEFUL MILITARY CAPABILITY, IT IS NOT BY ANY MEANS A PANACEA, NOR IS IT THE ONLY WEAPON THAT CAN BE DEPLOYED TO MEET VARIOUS KINDS OF SOVIET THREATS.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT IS YOUR DEPARTMENT'S ESTIMATE OF THE CURRENT MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES, AND HOW WILL IT, IN YOUR VIEW, BE AFFECTED ON THE ONE HAND BY THE CONTINUING SOVIET SUPPLIES AND BY THE PROPOSED ARMS PACKAGE NOW BEFORE CONGRESS?

BROWN: WELL THERE ARE SEVERAL QUESTIONS THERE, I WILL TRY TO ANSWER ALL OF THEM. THE BEST ESTIMATES OF THE BALANCE COMING FROM ALL OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE U.S. AND ALSO FROM MILITARY ANALYSTS IS THAT ISRAEL IS ABLE TO AND CAN CONTINUE TO DEFEAT ANY COMBINATION OF ARAB ADVERSARIES UNTIL, SAY, 1983. AND I SAY 1983 NOT BECAUSE THAT SUDDENLY CEASES THEN TO BE THE CASE, BUT BECAUSE THAT IS FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM NOW SO THAT IT IS HARD TO SEE FURTHER THAN THAT. THERE IS NO PARTICULAR REASON TO THINK THAT THINGS WILL CHANGE THEN, BUT WE CAN ESTIMATE WITH SOME CONFIDENCE UP UNTIL THAT POINT.

THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO SUPPLY MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO SOME OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBOURS AND SOME OF THE OTHER ARAB STATES - TO SYRIA WHICH DOES BORDER ON ISRAEL, TO UNCLASSIFIED

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IRAQ AND TO LIBYA WHICH DO NOT. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THAT IN MAKING THE ESTIMATES THAT I HAVE INDICATED ABOUT THE BALANCE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.

THE ARMS TRANSFER PACKAGE WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION WILL  
BE SENDING UP TO THE CONGRESS FOR ACTION LATER THIS  
MONTH INVOLVES ISRAEL, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA, NONE  
OF WHOM ARE RECIPIENTS OF SOVIET ARMS. WE BELIEVE  
THAT THAT PACKAGE DOES NOT CHANGE THE BALANCE THAT I  
HAVE DESCRIBED IN ANSWER TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION.  
ISRAEL WILL STILL BE IN A POSITION MILITARILY TO,  
SHOULD IT COME TO WAR, DEFEAT ITS ARAB ADVERSARIES.  
AND THE F 5S TO BE SOLD TO EGYPT, THE F 15S TO SAUDI  
ARABIA AND THE F 15S AND 16S TO BE SOLD TO ISRAEL  
IN MY JUDGEMENT, AND I THINK IN THE JUDGEMENT OF ALL  
MILITARILY INFORMED PEOPLE IN THE U. S. GOVERNMENT,  
PRESERVES THAT BALANCE. THE EGYPTIANS, THE  
ISRAELIS AND THE SAUDIS, OF COURSE, ARE THREE OF THE  
KEY NATIONS IN THE MIDEAST IN ARRIVING AT  
A PEACEFUL AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THERE, WHICH AGAIN  
IN MY VIEW IS THE WAY TO LONG TERM SECURITY FOR ALL  
THE NATIONS IN THE AREA. WE BELIEVE THAT HAVING THE  
UNITED STATES CONTINUE TO BE ON VERY CLOSE TERMS  
OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ISRAEL WHICH HAS, OF COURSE,  
BEEN THE CASE NOW FOR THE ALMOST 30 YEARS OF ISRAEL'S  
EXISTANCE, AND ALSO WITH THESE OTHER ARAB STATES  
WHICH, IN THE CASE OF EGYPT, CLEARLY PLAY AN  
IMMEDIATE ROLE IN ARRIVING AT THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT  
AND WHICH OBVIOUSLY ARE INCLINED, GIVEN DETAILED  
PROVISIONS THAT CAN BE AGREED, TO A PEACEFUL  
SETTLEMENT AND IN THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA, A COUNTRY  
THAT IS NOT ONLY KEY TO A SETTLEMENT BUT KEY TO  
THE WHOLE ISSUE OF THE FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST  
IN ECONOMIC TERMS AND VERY INFLUENTIAL IN THE REST  
OF THE WORLD IN ECONOMIC TERMS; THAT GIVEN THESE  
FACTORS IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S.  
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CONTINUE TO SHOW THAT IT IS ON FRIENDLY TERMS AND  
TO BEHAVE ON FRIENDLY TERMS WITH THOSE COUNTRIES.  
EACH OF THE THREE HAS INDICATED TO THE UNITED STATES  
THAT ITS SECURITY DEPENDS UPON RECEIPT OF THESE  
AIRCRAFT AND BOTH EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA PERCEIVE  
THEMSELVES, CORRECTLY IN MY VIEW, AS FACING SECURITY  
PROBLEMS FROM VARIOUS QUARTERS AND DON'T LOOK ON THESE  
WEAPONS AS WEAPONS TO BE ACCUMULATED FOR USE IN A  
WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB NEIGHBOURS.

QUESTION: SECRETARY BROWN, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS  
IN YOUR OWN NATIONAL PRESS WHICH CLAIM THAT THE  
SOVIET UNION NOW HAS 62 MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE  
SUBMARINES, EXACTLY THE NUMBER PERMITTED UNDER SALT 1,  
BUT THAT 2 MORE ARE READY FOR SEA TRIALS AND  
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SOMETHING LIKE ANOTHER 10 OR 12 ARE UNDER CONSTRUCTION.  
IT SUGGESTS THIS MEANS RUSSIA EITHER INTENDS TO  
VIOLATE SALT 1 OR TO FORCE AMERICA'S HAND IN SALT 11  
TO PERMITTING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MORE BOATS. COULD  
YOU COMMENT ON THIS?

BROWN: YES, 62 IS THE NUMBER PERMITTED UNDER THE  
INTERIM AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE  
FORCES WHICH FORMALLY HAS LAPSED BUT WHICH OTH  
THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE AGREED  
TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT WHILE SALT 11 IS NEGOTIATED.  
THERE IS, I BELIEVE YOU WILL FIND, A PROVISION FOR  
SUBMARINES TO BE COUNTED WHEN THEY ENTER ON TO SEA  
TRIALS AND, AS YOU SAY, THERE ARE A COUPLE OF

ADDITIONAL SOVIET SUBMARINES THAT HAVE NOT ENTERED ON TO SEA TRIAL BUT COULD IN A RELATIVELY SHORT TIME. THERE IS ALSO A PROVISION FOR OLDER SUBMARINES - BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES - TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE OR THEIR BALLISTIC MISSILES REMOVED FROM SERVICE AND SO LONG AS THAT IS DONE IN NUMBERS EQUAL TO NEW ONES THAT ENTER SEA TRIALS' THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO BE IN OBSERVANCE OF THE TREATY. I DON'T WANT TO FORECAST WHAT WILL HAPPEN. I JUST WANT TO OBSERVE THAT THOSE ARE THE PROVISIONS AND UNDER THOSE PROVISIONS THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE TO BE OBSERVED.

QUESTION: YOU WO- ULD EXPECT THE OLDER YANKEE CLASS SUBMARINE ....?

BROWN: I DON'T WANT TO GO INTO ANY MORE DETAIL.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, THE AWACS AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN HANGING AROUND NATO FOR A LONG TIME. DO YOU UNCLASSIFIED

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THINK THAT THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE FINAL DECISION ON THIS WILL BE MADE BY THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING THIS MAY, AND IF NOT, IS IT POSSIBLE TO PROTRACT THIS STILL LONGER WITHOUT THE PROGRAM COMING APART?

BROWN: IT WILL BE ADDRESSED AT THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE MEETING DURING THE MIDDLE OF MAY AND IT MAY OR MAY NOT THEN NEED TO BE ATTENDED TO AT THE SUMMIT. IT IS, I THINK, APPROPRIATELY A DEFENSE MINISTERS MATTER, IF THE DEFENSE MINISTERS CAN ARRIVE AT A CONCLUSION. IT HAS BEEN MOVING FORWARD IN FITS AND STARTS, AS YOU SAY FOR A COUPLE OF YEARS NOW. THE UNITED STATES, OF COURSE HAS PROCEEDED WITH ITS PROGRAM AND HAS ON ORDER A COUPLE OF DOZEN OF THEM. NATO HAS IN PRINCIPLE DECIDED TO GO AHEAD, IT IS A MATTER NOW OF WORKING OUT THE DETAILS OF A NATO BUY AND THE DIFFICULTIES, AS SO OFTEN IS THE CASE, LIE IN THE DETAILS. THESE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING WORKED OUT AND FACED UP TO AND INVOLVE LARGE EXPENDITURES AND I THINK WE WILL MAKE FURTHER FORWARD STEPS NEXT MONTH AT THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE. I WOULD HOPE THAT THOSE STEPS WOULD BE OF A SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE SO THAT THE PROGRAM CAN BE REGARDED AS SETTLED IN MORE THAN PRINCIPLE, BUT I DON'T WANT TO MAKE ANY PREDICTIONS. ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR NATO'S AIR DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES THAT AN AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL  
SYSTEM BE INSTALLED, OTHERWISE THERE IS A VERY  
DANGEROUS GAP IN NATO'S ABILITY TO DETECT  
PENETRATION AT LOW LEVELS FROM THE AIR, A GREAT  
PROBLEM OF THE VULNERABILITY OF GROUND RADAR SITES  
AND A GREAT DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING ONE'S OWN  
AIR INTERCEPTORS AND SURFACE TO AIR SYSTEMS.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 INR-10 L-03 ACDA-12

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INFO AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE

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USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE

USCINCEUR IMMEDIATE

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QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, I BELIEVE THAT THE GERMANS  
HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE NEUTRON BOMB CAN NOT BE USED  
IN ANY FUTURE SALT TALKS AS A COUNTERWEIGHT BECAUSE  
IT IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON BUT A TACTICAL NUCLEAR  
WEAPON. IS THIS CORRECT?

BROWN: I DON'T THINK THIS IS SOMETHING THE FRG (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY) HAS BEEN TOLD. IT IS A SIMPLE STATEMENT OF FACT, THAT THE NEUTRON BOMB IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON. IT WOULD MAKE NO SENSE TO CARRY IT IN ANY OF THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS THAT ARE LIMITED BY OR FORBIDDEN UNDER A STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT AND THEREFORE THERE IS NO LOGICAL WAY TO INTRODUCE IT INTO SALT TO BE BALANCED OFF AGAINST ANYTHING ELSE. AND I DON'T THINK THAT ANY UNCLASSIFIED

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GOVERNMENT HAS EVER RAISED IT AS A POSSIBILITY IN THAT REGARD.

QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICA, CAN YOU SAY WHETHER THE TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON PACIFYING THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA HAVE BEEN RESUMED?

BROWN: THERE WAS A MEETING, THE LATEST IN A SERIES OF MEETINGS, ON LIMITING DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA SEVERAL MONTHS AGO IN BERN, IF I REMEMBER. I THINK BERN IS THE SITE OF THAT PARTICULAR NEGOTIATION. THAT WAS THE MOST RECENT MEETING. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT U.S. ATTITUDES ON THE FEASIBILITY OF LIMITING SUCH DEPLOYMENTS ARE INFLUENCED BY THE VERY LARGE, NUMEROUS SOVIET NAVAL SHIP DEPLOYMENTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AT THE PRESENT TIME AND RECENTLY. SO THAT CLEARLY THAT IS AN INFLUENCE. THERE IS NO POINT AGREEING TO REDUCTION IN MILITARY LEVELS IN A CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE IT IS CLEAR THAT THAT IS NOT HAPPENING NOW.

QUESTION: AND HOW ABOUT ARMS SALES IN THE SAME CONTEXT?

BROWN: IF YOU ARE SPEAKING OF U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS TO DISCUSS LIMITATIONS OF SALES OF COVENTIONAL ARMS TO OTHER COUNTRIES, THERE WILL BE DISCUSSIONS ALONG THOSE LINES RATHER SOON, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY. I WOULD ADD THAT THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE ABLE TO AND DID TRANSFER TO -E-THIOPIA OVER A PERIOD OF A FEW MONTHS ROUGHLY UNCLASSIFIED

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\$1 BILLION WORTH OF COVENTIONAL ARMS IS A FACTOR OF WHICH WE HAVE TAKEN NOTE AND WE FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THAT IS A SIGN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE REDUCING THEIR INTERESTS IN SELLING ARMS. THEY CLEARLY CONTINUE TO SELL THEM.

QUESTION: WOULD YOU MAKE SOME PREDICTIONS ON SALT TALKS. IN PARTICULAR YOU HAVE TAKEN A FAIRLY STRONG LINE ON BACKFIRE, DO YOU THINK THAT IT SHOULD BE PART OF THE AGREEMENT OR THAT A DECLARATION OF INTENT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT?

BROWN: BACKFIRE CLEARLY HAS THE CAPABILITY TO REACH THE U.S. FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITH REFUELLING, WHATEVER ITS DESIGNED PURPOSE. THEREFORE, IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN SOME WAY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO HAVE SOME ASSURANCES LIMITING BACKFIRE UTILITY IN THIS ROLE. THE EXACT FORM AND THE EXACT SUBSTANCE OF SUCH ASSURANCES NEED TO BE NEGOTIATED AND THEY NEED TO BE NEGOTIATED IN A WAY THAT IS SUFFICIENTLY BINDING TO GIVE US THOSE REASSURANCES. THANK YOU.

BREWSTER.

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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014